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Shoftimתשע״ד5774Parsha

Parshas Shoftim: The Yachid and the Rabbim

Beginning with the Torah's unusual description of Klal Yisroel as "V'hanisharim" (the remaining ones) after Eidim Zomemim are executed, the essay shows that every single Jew is a precious diamond whose loss leaves the nation permanently incomplete. Yet from Egla Arufa and the obligation of Levaya we learn (per the Maharal) that the Zechus HaRabim of a Tzibbur offers protection that no individual possesses. Drawing on the Maharal, R' Chaim Shmulevitz, the Rama M'Pano, and R' Simcha Zissel, the author concludes that individuals who take responsibility for others are themselves considered a Klal, and thereby merit the Tzibbur's eternality and leniency in judgment \_ssummary_note":null,"x":null}

In this week’s Parsha we have a number of Mitzvos that relate to Bais Din the general Halachos pertaining to jurisprudence and court procedure, as indicated by the name of the Parsha—Shoftim.

One of the topics discussed in the Parsha is that of Eidim Zomemim —witnesses who are proven to have provided testimony that they couldn’t have witnessed. The basic case of Eidim Zomemim is that two witnesses come to Bais Din and testify that someone else committed an Issur at a certain place and time—thereby being Mechayev the person about whom they are testifying some sort of punishment, be it Mammom, Malkos or Missa.

If following the testimony, and subsequent decision by Bais Din that the person is indeed Mechayev, yet another set of Eidim arrive and testify that the first set was with them in a separate place at the indicated time and date—that they could not possibly have witnessed the act that they say they saw because they were elsewhere at the time—the first set of Eidim become Eidim Zomemim.

The Pasuk tells us “VaAsisem Lo K’Asher Zamam La’asos L’Achiv: then you shall do to him (the Eidim Zomemim), that which he sought to do to his brother.” The punishment for the Eidim Zomemim is same punishment that the originally convicted party would have faced. This is a unique Halacha, as in most cases the Torah proscribes a particular punishment for someone who commits a particular Issur, but in this case it depends on the testimony they gave.

The next Pasuk says that when the punishment is given to the Eidim Zomemim, the rest of the Klal will hear about it so that they will be dissuaded from themselves bearing testimony that they didn’t actually see.

But the way that the rest of the Klal is referred to in this case is itself interesting: “V’hanisharim Yishmau V’Yirau: And the remaining ones should hear of it (the punishment) and fear…” Why is the rest of the Klal referred to as the remaining ones? They are the majority, only two seemingly evil people, have been put to death, why are the rest the remainder?

Earlier in the Parsha the Torah has a similar phrase with regard to others who are killed by Bais Din and there the Torah says: “V’chol HaAm.” What should we learn from the difference in the language in this case?

The Sefer Ohel Moshe points out this change in the terminology and has an insight Al Derech HaDrush: If one has a collection of insignificant items, stones for example, and one gets lost, the collection is still seen as essentially whole—after all only one stone is missing. In that case, referring to the collection of stones as “the remaining ones” would be inappropriate.

But if one has a collection of precious items, diamonds for example, and one or two get lost, the collection is not complete and never can be. In this case the diamonds he still has are indeed “the remaining ones” because the loss is so great.

This can be seen in the way that we refer to those who survived the Holocaust and rebuilt their lives on the shores of America and Eretz Yisroel: the Shearis HaPleitah,

which literally means “the Remaining Refugees.” The word Shearis, remaining, reminds us that there were others that didn’t make it, that perished in Europe. Any time we refer to something as “the remaining” it serves as a reminder that something else is missing.

The Ohel Moshe explains that the Torah here teaches us the value of a single Jew. Yes, the ones who are killed by Bais Din as Eidim Zomemim committed a terrible Aveirah and suffered the most severe punishment. But they were still Jews, and each and every single member of Klal Yisroel is a diamond: precious and unique. When we lose even one, the rest of us are “the remaining” as we can never again be complete.

That is the power and value of a single Jew. But sometimes that Koach is not enough.

At the end of the Sedra is the Parsha of Egla Arufa. If a dead body is found between two cities, the elders of the city to which it is closest must slaughter a calf outside the city, in a ritual filled with symbolism.

The Zekainim wash their hands over the dead calf and proclaim: “Yadnu Lo Shafcha Es HaDam HaZeh, V’Eenenu Lo Rau: We did not commit this murder, and we did not see him.” We would not assume that Bais din committed the murder, so why do they have to claim innocence? The Gemarah in Sotah explains that Bais Din is proclaiming that they did not send the man away without food and they did not see him and allow him to leave with escorting him.

It seems that if Bais Din had allowed the man to leave without escorting him they would be held responsible for his subsequent murder. In fact, the Halacha of Levaya—escorting guests from our homes—is learned from this Parsha precisely because of this.

The Halacha of Levaya is certainly an important one, but why would Bais Din be held responsible for the man’s death just because they didn’t escort him from the city?

Certainly they would not be required to walk with him for more than a short distance, so their mere presence would not necessarily forestall his eventual murder? This does not seem to be a matter of practicality—safety in numbers.

The Maharal explains that if he would have left with the escort of Bais Din he would have had the Zechus HaRabim with him and that would have protected him. His lack of a proper escort by Bais Din removed this protection of the Tizbbur from him and he was therefore vulnerable to murderers.

We see from here the unbelievable Koach of a Rabbim or Tzibbur. Yes, each member of Klal Yisroel is precious and has an unbelievable Koach in his own right, but a Tzibbur is even more powerful. If this victim of murder had been escorted by members of the community, that Koach HaRabim would have prevented his ultimate demise.

It is said that if one seeks to be Zoche B’din on Rosh Hashana—to merit a positive judgment—he should attach himself to the Klal. One way to do this is to take responsibility to the Klal, in the words of one of my Rabbeim “make yourself indispensable to the Klal.”

In this month of Elul it would certainly be prudent to try and understand the Koach of the Tzibbur, and why one is Zoche B’Din if he attaches himself to the Klal and takes responsibility for it.

I think we can understand this based on two insights.

The is a specific Koach of Kiyum inherent in a Tzibbur—the Klal is eternal. This Yesod is mentioned in a number of Seforim.

The Maharal, for example, says that there is no concept of an Aveira committed by a Tzibbur. This is because when a person does an Aveira he changes—from his essentially good existence to a negative state—but change does not apply to a Tzibbur. If an entire Tzibbur is seen to have done an Aveira that is because each individual himself committed the Aveira, but the Tzibbur as a whole cannot, because it cannot make that change from good to bad. A Tzibbur is eternal and unchanging.

R’ Chaim Shmulevitz explains this on a different level using a Mashal: each member of Klal Yisroel is akin to a piece of straw, which even a small child can easily break. But if a number of pieces of straw are bundled together, they cannot easily be broken—much strength is gained from the fact that they are tied together. This is an illustration of the everlasting nature of a Klal.

The Rama M’Pano seems to indicate, in contrast to the Maharal above, that the concept of Aveiros of a Klal exists, but that these Aveiros are themselves subject a less stringent din than those of an individual.

It therefore seems, based on these and other sources, that a Klal is everlasting and its Aveiros are more easily forgiven. How can we use this to be Zoche B’din?

The Sefer Chayei HaMussar brings an unbelievable insight from R’ Simcha Zissel.

The Gemarah in Yevamos tells of the destruction of the Talmdei R’ Akiva and says that following their deaths the world was void of Torah, until R’ Akiva went to the five Rabbanim in the Darom—R’ Meir, R’ Yehuda, R’ Yosi, R’ Shimon and R’ Elazar Ben Shamuah—and taught them. The Gemarah says of those five: “V’hem hem Heemidu Torah Oso Shah…And they revived Torah at that moment.”

One of the difficulties in understanding that Gemarah is that while those five began to learn, the rest of the world, indeed the rest of Klal Yisroel was still void of Torah. Yes they could then disseminate the words of R’ Akiva and revive Torah, but how could that be understood as “Oso Shah?”

R’ Simcha Zissel explains that when Yichidim take responsibility for the Klal, they are themselves considered the Klal. Hem Hem Heemidu Torah: V’hem hem Heemidu Torah: When those five Talmidim took responsibility for reviving the learning of Torah, it was as if the Torah had already been resurrected in the entire Klal—because they were the Klal.

This applies not only to those who take responsibility to the entire Klal. R’ Simcha Zissel says: “Yichidim HaMivakshim Zeh La’zeh, V’doagim Zeh La’zeh: Individuals who look out for one another and worry about one another.”

If we worry about others than just ourselves—if we look out for those who maybe cannot lookout for themselves—than we can be considered a Klal ourselves. And if we are considered a Klal than we can be Zoche to the Koach of the Klal described by the Maharal and R’ Chaim, and our Aveiros will be subject to the same decreased level of Din as brought by the Rama M’pano. In this way our commitment to others will help us be Zoche B’din in the coming year.