Thinking Thoughts

Among the many Mitzvos spoken about in this week’s Parsha is the Mitzvah of Shemitta. As is the case with many of the other Mitzvos spoken about in Parshas Re’eh, we had previously learned about Shemita in Sefer Vayikra. There is, however, a key difference between the Halachos spoken about there, and those in this Parsha. In Parshas Behar the Torah tells us about Shemitas Karkaos, meaning the Halachos pertaining to letting the land rest in the seventh year, which are the Dinim that are the most detailed and really make up most of Hilchos Shemita. In our Parsha, however, the Halachos discussed are those of Shemitas Kesafim an area which is really limited to one simple Din: when Shemitah arrives, and loan not secured by collateral is automatically voided. This Halacha is one that pertains to us even as we live in Chutz L’aretz and is certainly worthy of discussion, but there is one Passuk in particular that touches on this Halacha that would appear to hold a valuable lesson for us all.

After teaching us about Shemitas Kesafim, the Torah goes on to discuss the Mitzvah of Tzeddaka in general, including the imperative to extend a loan to one may need it. These two Halachos, Shemitas Kesafim and the Mitzvah of making a loan, are clearly linked, and as such the Torah issues a warning: “Hishomer Lecha Pen Yihiyeh Davar Im Livavcha Blial Lemor Karva Shenas Hasheva Shenas HaShemitta.” Beware, says the Passuk, that you do not think about the approaching Shemitah when deciding about giving a loan. In a sense, the Torah seems to be anticipating a very rational thought process: someone who is asked to lend money to his fellow Jew may consider the fact that Shemitah will remove this debt and if he thinks that there isn’t sufficient time for the loan to be repaid, he might let this reality cloud his decision. The Torah is therefore clearly warning us not to fall into this trap. Rather, we are enjoined to make the appropriate loan, and we are promised that Hashem will repay us in kind.

There are, however, two interesting points about this Passuk.

First, the Torah does not only anticipate this thought process, but gives it a name: Davar Blial. Rahsi does not discuss the word Blial, but the Ibn Ezra notes that it is a conjunction, apparently of the words “Bli” and “Ol”. While the exact translation is not, the intent of these words is clear: the Torah considers such an idea repugnant and indicative of some sort of “Prikas Ol.” Why though is this necessary? At the end of the Passuk the Torah clearly states that denying a loan because of Shemitah is an Aveira: “V’Haya Becha Chet.” Why then does the Torah go out of its way to label the thought, to place an adjective upon this base thought process?

In fact, we must also consider why the Torah had to spell out the “Davar Blial” at all? There is a Mitzvah to extend a loan to one who needs it and in fact we just read a number of Pessukim that discuss the imperative and Schar for this Mitzvah. If someone avoids the performance of the Mitzvah, do his motivations for doing so really matter? Would he not be just a liable for not extending the loan for some other reason—why did the Torah need to specify this exact train of thought?

The truth is that Chazal seem to learn a wide ranging idea from this very Passuk. The Gemarah in Bava Basra tells us: “ Kol HaMialem Einav Min Hatzedaka Ki’ilu Oved Avodah Zarah”, one who removes his eyes, that is avoids, Tzeddak is compared to one who serves Avodah Zarah. The Gemarah expands on the source for this Memra: Our Passuk uses the word “Blial” in referencing someone who avoids making a loan, and the Passuk last week’s Parsha uses the same word in relation to Ir Hanidachas. The word “Blial”, then, seems to imply a type of Avoda Zarah, indicating that one who would avoid making a loan because of the approaching Shemitah is guilty of a transgression tantamount to the most serious of Aveiros.

The question that clearly arises from this Gemarah, however, is why this is the case. Why is one who avoids Tzeddaka, and specifically in the way and for the reasons described in the Passuk, equated to one who serves Avoda Zarah? It is unlikely that the Torah wishes only to indicate the severity of the Aveirah, for then it could have been compared to any other serious Chet, rather it seems that there is an element of actual Avoda Zarah in this type of behavior.

The simplest answer, offered by some Meforshim, is that when one refuses to give someone a loan because he is fearful that it may not be paid back on time and thus be wiped away be Shemittah, he displays a lack of basic Bitachon. If he truly believed that what he has is from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and the actions of others can in no way impact his fiscal security, he would not be concerned about the onset of Shemita. By taking the potential to be paid back, based on the approaching Shemita, into his decision making process, his lack of Bitachon rises to a level that borders on Kefirah, and is akin to Avodah Zarah.

While this approach makes sense in the context of the Gemarah, and is itself quite chilling for us to consider, there is another Passuk, also reated to that calls this idea into question.

In Parshas Behar the Torah speaks about Shemitah and Yovel, and the various Halachos that apply during those special years, including of course the Issurim of working the land. There is a Passuk that comes at the end of this section that in some way mirrors the Passuk we are discussing in Parshas Re’eh: “V’chi Somru Mah Nochal BaShana HaShviis, Hen Lo Nesaf Es Tevuaseinu.” The Torah anticipates a question that someone may ask: if we are prohibited from working the field in the seventh year, what are we to eat? The Torah answers this question in the next Passuk: “V’Tzivisi Es Birchasi Lachem BaShana HaShishis V’Asa Es HaTevuah L’Shalosh HaShanim.” Hashem promises that the bountiful crops will be provided in the sixth year such that there will be enough to provide for the sixth, seventh and eighth years.

As noted, this Passuk bears some similarities to our Passuk in Parshas Re’eh: here too the Torah anticipates a concern related to the restrictions of Shemitah. If we think about it, this question belies a certain lack of Bitachon as well: if we believe that Hashem provides for us each day, why would we think the year of Shemitah would be any different? But in this case, rather than point out the objectionable nature of this question, the Torah answers it outright!

If we are to understand that the concern of “Karva Shenas Hasheva” is equated to Avodah Zarah because it stems from a lack of Bitachon, why would not the concern of “Mah Nochal BaShana HaShviis” be similarly frowned upon? Why in one case is the question treated with disdain and in the other answered so plainly?

The truth is that there is one glaring difference between the two Pessukim: in the case of Shemitas Karkaos, the one asking “Mah Nochal BaShana HaShviis” is limiting his question to his own self, whereas the quandary of “Karva Shenas Hasheva” impacts others as well. Perhaps herein lies the solution.

The Sefer Arvei Nachal points out that all of Klal Yisroel is considered “Guf Echad”, one body. When it comes to his physical body, a person is equally concerned with his toe, which is an “unessential” body part as he is with his heart. Our attitude towards our fellow Jews, then, must take the same shape—we must think about all Jews, whether they seem important or not. The basic Middah of Rachmanus, inherent in all members of the Am Hanivchar, thus dictates that we look at Aniyim and those in need with mercy, seeking to help them in any way we can. If someone does not act this way, explains the Arvei Nachal, it is indicative of his standing among the Am Hanivchar. Only if one’s relationship with Hashem is truly ruptured, can he stoop to the level of ignoring or disparaging Aniyim—only if he is disconnected from Hakadosh Baruch Hu can he display a basic lack of this most important Middah necessary to look away from those who need his help. This is why one who is HaMalem Einav Min Hatzedaka is compared to an Oved Avodah Zarah—his ability to look away from his fellow Jew is indicative of his departure from the Derech Hayashar.

This is why the Torah treats these two questions, that of “Mah Nochal BaShana HaShviis” and that of “Karva Shenas Hasheva” so differently. Having questions that stem from a minor lack of Bitachon is understandable, we are after all human, but when we allow these matters to affect our treatment of others, our true deficiencies are glaringly apparent. The Torah can address the question of “Mah Nochal BaShana HaShviis”, but must point out the purely revolting nature of even thinking “Karva Shenas Hasheva”.

It appears than that our Passuk is not at all about Shemitah—it is about Tzeddaka. The Torah The Torah delineated the crooked thought process of “Karva Shenas Hasheva”, and labeled it as a “Davar Blial” to teach us an important lesson—our very connection to Hashem is mirrored in the way we treat others. If we find ourselves avoiding opportunities to fulfill the Mitzvos of Tzedaka and Chessed detailed in the adjacent Pessukim, we must realize that this is because we are lacking in our identity as members of the Am HaNivchar.

If we are successful in maintaining a productive and fruitful relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we will be able to fully capitalize on the myriad of Tzedaka and Chesed opportunities that surround us, and this be Zoche to the Bracha found at the end of these Pessukim: “Yivarechicha Hashem Elokecha B’Kol Ma’asecha U’Bikol Mishlach Yadecha.”