פרק ט׳׳ו - Mishpatim: Zero Interest
Tehillim 15 answers Dovid Hamelech's question of who merits closeness to Hashem, culminating with avoiding Ribis and Shochad — which Chazal explain as refraining even from permitted cases (Ribis Akum, a Dayan recusing himself over past benefit), i.e. acting Lifnim Mishuras HaDin. Drawing on Maharal (via R' Chaim Friedlander) that Ribis is called an 'Ol' because charging interest is intuitive and natural, the essay explains why Chazal equate accepting the Ol Ribis with Kabalas Ol Malchus Shamayim and tie it to Yetzias Mitzrayim: denying Ribis is denying the purpose of the Exodus. One who trains himself to forgo even permitted profit and permitted self-interest conditions himself to place Hashem's will above his own, and is thus worthy of a Makom Kavod.
Kapital 15 begins with the words “L’Dovid Mizmor” and is entirely devoted to answering a question asked by Dovid Hamelech in the very first Passuk: “Hashem Mi Yagur B’Ohalecha Mi Yishkon B’Har Kodshecha”. Radak explains that both the terms “Ohalecha” and “Har Kodshecha” refer to Olam Habba the Passuk is speaking about Shamayim, and the question posed is: who will be Zoche to a “Makom Kavod” in Olam Habbah? Metzudos, however, sees the Passuk slightly differently, as referring to the Mikdash, which was of course was the Ohel of HKBH on “Har Kadosh”. In this view, the question asked pertains to those who may hope to have a Chelek in the Avodas HaMikdash.
Whether we assume that Dovid is speaking about Olam Habba or the Mikdash, we can paraphrase the question similarly: what are the qualities that define one who will be Zoche to be close to HKBH—be it in this world or the next? What, as Rashi explains, is the Midas HaChasidsus that allows one to reach this level? The remaining Pessukim in this short Kapital answer the question very directly.
The first quality listed is “Holech Tamim U’Poel Tzedek”, one who walks on the correct Derech and accomplishes acts of Tzidkus. Sforno defines this a little more precisely as one who is “Mativ LZulaso”, does good for others with no self-interest. The Tziddkus involved in such acts is highlighted by the end of the Passuk “V’Dover Emes B’Levavo”, which Metzudos explains as referring to Chasadim that are done “M’Emes Machshavos Libo L’Dvar Mitzvah”, completely L’Shem Shamayim.
The next quality listed is “Lo Ragal Al Leshono”, referring to the many Aveiros that can be done with a persons mouth. The one who will be Zoche to a Makom Kavod must be careful to avoid all such speech. Ibn Ezra explains that these words refer specifically to one who can keep a secret—certainly a laudable Madreigah.
The Tzaddik described in this Perek is not defined by his actions alone, it seems, but also in the way he relates to others—for better or worse. On one hand, he must possess the quality of “Nivzeh B’Einav Nimas”—which Rashi explains as a disgust for Reshaim—but he must also honor those who define Tov: “Yirei Hashem Yichabed”.
Overall, the picture drawn by the Pessukim is one of a true Tzaddik, who cares for others and his careful in the way he relates to those around him. The final qualities listed in the Perek, though, may give us some pause: “Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech V’Shochad Al Naki Lo Yikach”. Among the characteristics of one who will be Zoche to a Makom Kavod close to HKBH is that he loans money without Ribis, and does not accept bribery against the innocent.
The question on there words is quite glaring: the Torah, in this week’s Parsha, makes it quite clear that both Shochad and Ribbis are completely Assur. Why, then, are these included amongst the traits of one who answers the question “Mi Yagur B’Ohalecha Mi Yishkon B’Har Kodshecha”? What is the Tzidkus involved in avoiding two clear Isssurim?
The Gemara in Makos seems to answer this question, defining this Passuk slightly differently than one might at first assume. The words “Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech”, explains the Gemarah, refer Ribis Akum, lending money to a non-Jew with interest. The Tazaddik defined in this Passuk, it seems, would avoid even such activities, which are allowed. The Gemara then defines the words “V’Shochad Al Naki Lo Yikach” as referring to a Dayan who will not hear a case because he has benefited from one of the litigants in the past—as R’ Yishmael ben R’ Yosi who would not hear the case of his sharecropper, who sometimes brought him fruit.
The Gemara is telling us that although Ribis and Shochad are indeed Assur, the Passuk in Tehillim is speaking about one who acts “Lifnim Mishuras HaDin”, and does not accept Ribis or Shochad even when it is allowed or perhaps not defined as such in the technical sense.
While we can now better understand the words of the Passuk, and how they are to be viewed in context, some additional clarity is needed.
The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, at the beginning of Hilchos Ribis, both Pasken that not only is one allowed to lend money to a non-Jew with Ribis, but this is actually a Mitzvas Asei, as the Passuk says “L’Nochri Tashoch”. Based on this, two questions emerge.
First, it does not seem that the examples of Ribis and Shochad given by the Gemara are similar: in the case of Shochad, the Dayan chooses not to be involved in a case in which he may have a bias based on past benefits. This is allowed, for the Dayan has no obligation to be involved in any particular matter, especially if he questions his own ability to be impartial. Ribbis Akum, on the other hand, is completely different: in this case, the Tzaddik refrains from fulfilling a Mitzvas Asei, not just avoid a possible hint of Issur. Why does the Gemara compare them?
On a broader level, how do we understand the Passuk? If the words “Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech” refers to one who refrains from Ribis Akum, why is this Tzidkus—he is avoiding a Mitzas Asei? Why does Dovid seem to laud one who does not lend money with interest even to a non-Jew, if such activities are actually praiseworthy?
Even if we answer these questions, one more remains: if the words “Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech V’Shochad Al Naki Lo Yikach” refer merely to one who acts in a manner of “Lifnim Mishuras HaDin”, why did Dovid choose these Mitzvos in particular? There are many examples that can be given of such behavior, in areas of Bein Adam LaMakom or Bein Adam L’Chaveiro, across all Chalakim of Shulach Aruch. Why are these Mitzvos, Ribis and Shochad, named in particular?
In order to clarify the intent of the Passuk, it may be helpful to try and answer the most glaring question: why is the avoidance of Ribbis Akum, a Mitzvas Asei, praised in this Perek?
In general, the Issur of Ribbis seems to carry a tremendous amount of weight. For example, there are various Mamarei Chazal that compare Ribbis to all Taryag Mitzvos: if one has money and does not lend it with Ribis, it is considered as though he has been Mekayem all the Mitzvos. This is a comparison that exists with regard to Mitzvos such as Shabbos and Avodah Zarah, which are elementary to Yiddishkeit, and these Medrashim seem to place Ribis in this category as well.
This notion becomes even stronger based on a Safra in Parshas Behar. The Medrash there tells us “Kol Hamekabel Alav Ol Ribis Mekabel Alav Ol Shamayim”, one who accepts the burden of Ribbis is accepting the “Ol Malchus Shamayim” as well. Further, the Pessukim there that discuss Ribbis end with the words “Ani Hashem Elokeichem Asher Hotzeisi Eschem M’Eretz Mitzrayim”, and the Safra concludes: “Al Tenai Kach Hotzeisi Eschem M’eretz Mitzrayim”. Yetizas Mitzrayim itself was contingent on our acceptance of Hilchos Ribbis. Further, one who is Kofer in Ribbis is considered to have been Kofer in Yetzias Mitzrayim.
How can we understand this? why and how is the Issur Ribbis so elementary to Yiddishkeit that it is
Keneged Taryag Mitzvos, akin to Kabalas Ol Shamayim, and so closely tied to Yetzias Mitzrayim?
R’ Chaim Friedlander zt”l, in Sifsei Chaim on Parshas Yisro, asks this question on the Safra, and answers based on a Maharal in Nesiv HaTzedka.
An “Ol”, explains Maharal, is something that is difficult to carry because it is against a person’s very nature—it defies his Teva. Ribis, referred to in the Medrash as “Ol Ribbis” is defined as such because in many ways, the practice of charging interest is very much intuitive. A borrower, in most cases, is happy to pay interest in return for his loan—Ribbis need not be predatory. Further, the lender loses money by lending without interest, because he cannot use that capital for other purposes. Therefore, concludes Maharal, the Mitzvah of Ribbis is a significant “Ol”, one that is a burden to bear. As such, one who is Mekabel the Ol Ribbis is indeed Mekabel the Ol Shamayim, and is considered to have fulfilled the Taryag
Mitzvos because he has displayed an ability to place the interests of Shamayim above his own—quite literlaly.
Based on this, R’ Chaim explains the final statement of the Medrash.
The entire purpose of Yetzias Mitzrayim was to create a nation of those willing to be Mekabel an Ol Shamayim, to bear the Ol Torah and fulfil the Ratzon HaBorei. If one denies the Mitzvah of Ribbis because he feels that the Ol is too much, that his fiscal considerations outweigh the dictates of the Torah, he is Kofer not in the reality of Yetzias Mitzrayim, but in its purpose. His is not a historical denial, says R’ Chaim, but rather an conceptual one: he may know that Hashem took us out of Mitzrayim, but he does not understand why.
If a person truly understands why were taken from Mitzrayim, why we were whisked out of the Kur HaBarzel and taken to Har Sinai, he will be able to put aside his own considerations and bear the “Ol Ribis” with pride.
Based on this idea, we can explain the words “Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech V’Shochad Al Naki Lo Yikach”.
When one refrains from lending Ribbis even when it is allowed, in the case of Ribis Akum, he trains himself to accept the Ol Ribbis. Rather than profiting from his loan, albeit in an acceptable way, he restrains his Teva, which will in turn make it easier to maintain the Halachos when they do apply. This is someone who understands that the Halachos of Ribbis are emblematic of something larger: an ability to place the interests of Shamayim above our own.
The case of “allowable” Shochad mentioned in the Gemara has the same purpose: when a Dayan attunes himself to potential bias, he is better able to suspend self-interest in the service of Mishpat and Emes. If he refuses to hear any case that he may in some way have Negius to, he makes it easier to do so when the benefits are even more compelling, enhancing his own Kabalas Ol Mitzvos.
These final qualities mentioned in the Perek are thus a fitting capstone to its entirety. If a person is defined by the characteristics of Kaspo Lo Nasan B’Neshech V’Shochad Al Naki Lo Yikach, as explained by Chazal, he is perforce a person who grasps the true purpose of life. He has conditioned and prepared himself to carry the “Ol Torah”, so that he may fulfill the ultimtate purpose of Yetzias Mitzaryim and become a true Eved Hashem, worthy of a Makom Kavod in Olam HaZeh and Olam Habbah.