Not By Choice

It is quite rare to Lein the actual Haftorah of Parshas Miketz, as it is almost always Shabbos Chanukah. In a somewhat ironic twist, however, the Haftorah that is least familiar is comprised of a story that is among the most widely known. In a way this makes it easier to learn the Haftorah, but, we cannot let our familiarity with the story distract us from its message.

The Haftorah comes from Sefer Melachim and tells the story of the two ladies who come before Shlomo Hamelech with a disputed baby. This episode is well-known even to secular audiences, and serves as the prime example of Solomonic Wisdom, but the story is not mere folklore. The Pessukim tell the story from the perspective of one of the mothers, who explains that they each had a child, and one baby was found to have dies during the night. Each now claimed that the living baby was theirs and they asked Shlomo Hamelech to resolve the dispute. The Navi tells us that, after clarifying their claims, Shlomo asked that a sword be brought, and then proposed to divide the baby in two, giving half to each of the mothers. One of the ladies protested, pleading that the baby be given to the other lady rather than ending its life. The second mother, on the other hand, approved of the king’s proposal. It was at this point that Shlomo rendered his decision, stating that the baby be given to the mother who protested.

The story itself is easy to understand, but there is a very basic question that can be asked on these Pessukim: why do they exist? Anything that is written in the Navi is there for a purpose, not for historical record or mere fableEven if we assume that the purpose is to tell us about the Chachma of Shlomo Hamelech, to what end? . What is the purpose of this story—what are we meant to learn from it?

This question becomes even more pressing if we consider a Medrash in Koheles Rabba.

The Passuk introduces the litigants in this case as “Shaytim Nashim Zonos” but provides no other identifying details. Ralbag suggests that the term “Zonah” here is to be understood as it is in the case of Rachav: they were innkeepers who provided Mazon to their patrons. The Medrash in Koheles Rabba, however, brings a Machlokes as to their identity: one Shita is that they were “Ruchos”, one Shita is that they were Yevamos, and the third Shita is that they were Zonos Mamesh. The second two Shitos in the Medrash don’t much change the story, but the first one does considerably. If the two “Nashim Zonos” were in fact Ruchos, and not people, than the story can never have actually happened, but was in a sense manufactured. The Ruchos must have been sent to act out this drama for the sake of eliciting a judgment from Shlomo Hamlech. The obvious question, then, is: why? Why was it important for this case to be presented to Shlomo just for him to render a decision in a matter that wasn’t even reality?

The question now is not why the story appears in the Pessukim, but why it happened at all.

The answer to this question may be found at the very end of the Haftroah. After the conclusion of the story, the Navi tells us: “VaYishmiu Kol Yisroel Es HaMishpat Asher Shafat Hamelech”. The news of Shlomo’s decision spread, until everyone in Klal Yisroel had heard about it, and it affected them “VaYiru Mipnei HaMelech”, they feared him. It seems that the purpose of the story may have been for the people, so that they would see the way Shlomo made his decision and better understand his essence. Even according to the Shita that the Nashim Zonos were actually Ruchos, there was a reason for this story to play out—so that Klal Yisroel may learn about their King.

If this was the reason that the story happened in the first place, perhaps it can also help us understand why it is written about in the Navi. Maybe the lesson that the people learned can apply to us as well, teaching us not only about Shlomo Hamelech, but also ourselves. To capitalize on this opportunity, it would seem important to understand just what the people learned from the story.

The Passuk continues telling us why Bnei Yisroel reacted this way: “Ki Ra’uh Ki Chachmas Elokim B’Kirbo”. Based on his judgment, Klal Yisroel understood that Shlomo had within him an element of “Chachmas Elokim” and that caused them to see the king in a new light, and to fear him.

This of course raises a new question: what is Chachmas Elokim? Why did they identify this particular Middah in the Mishpat of Shlomo and why did it cause them to fear him?

It would be easy to downplay the impact that the Chachmas Elokim had on those who appreciated it, but in fact it seems to have made quite an impression.

Rashi, earlier, brings a Gemarah in Makos which says that this was one of the three times that a Bas Kol affirmed a judgement made in Bais Din. According to the Gemarah, the words “Hi Imo”, which appear in the Passuk that describes the verdict, were not said by Shlomo but by a Bas Kol. Shlomo ruled that the baby be given to the mother who protested, but it was the Bas Kol that stated that she was in fact the true mother.

Abarbenel points out that, as per the final Passuk in the Haftorah, the people were impacted more by the Chachmas Elokim than by the fact that a Bas Kol affirmed Shlomo’s decision: “Ki Ra’uh Ki Chachmas Elokim B’Kirbo”. Certainly, then, we must understand what Chachmas Elokim is, and why it made such an impression.

Metzudos explains that the people saw that Shlomo’s wisdom was penetrating and realized that they would not be able to slip anything by him, and this instilled within them a fear of the king’s Mishpat. But why is this Chachmas Elokim? Shlomo Hamelech was certainly a Chacham, and that Chachma would seem to give him insight into the nature of man, and detect where the faults in a story lie—an ability highlighted by this story—but why is this called “Chachmas Elokim”?

There is another person mentioned in Tanach who is given a similar approbation, and perhaps that usage can apply here as well, and help us understand the gift that Shlomo Hamelech possessed.

The Pessukim in Sefer Daniel describe a vision that Belshatzar, the king of Bavel at the time, had. Belshatzar was terrified by his experience, and sent for his wisest and most powerful advisors to explains what it meant. The Pessukim describe how each of them came before the king and attempted to explain the sight, but none were able to do so in a satisfactory way. Finally, the Queen arrived, and suggested that she knew who might be able to help the king.

“Isi Gevar B’Malchusach Di Ruach Elakin Kadishin Bei…” The Queen tells Belshatzar that there is a man in his kingdom who possesses Ruach Elokim, and whom served as an advisor to his father, Nevuchadnetzar. The queen was of course speaking about Daniel, to whom she attributes various qualities including: “Chachma K’Chahmas Elokim.” The king of course summons Daniel who ends up interpreting the vision and advising Belshatzar how to proceed.

Daniel, who is described in Chazal as being a great Chacham, is described as having Chachmas Elokim—the same as the Chachma attributed to Shlomo Hamelech in our Haftorah. Rashi in Sefer Daniel actually provides a definition of this Chachma in one word: “Malachim”. The Chachmas Elokim with which Daniel, and Shlomo Hamelech, are said to be gifted is in some way related to the Chachma of Malachim, who are sometimes referred to as Elokim.

In order to further explain what the Chacham Elokim might be, then, we of course have to understand a little more about Malachim in general.

Rav Dessler, in many places throughout Michtav M’Eliyahu, speaks about the qualities of Malachim. One of the central Yesodos that he lays out is that Malachim are incapable of Bechira—they do only what the Ratzon Hashem obliges of them.

In fact, so far removed are the Malachim from Bechira, that they do not even relate to the concept. For one to really exercise choice, explains Rav Dessler, he must entertain both options. When we are presented with an opportunity to follow either our Yetzer Tov, or not, even when we opt to go down the correct path, we must have first considered both possibilities, otherwise it was not a moment of true Bechira. Even this “Hava Amina” is foreign to Malachim who have no connection whatsoever to Bechira.

An outgrowth of their lack of Bechira, explains R’ Dessler, is that Malachim have a very limited sense of self, what is termed “Yeshus” or “Anochius”. The Malach has no self-interest, he is limited to the exact mission that he was given. This was one of the reasons that the Malachei Hashares were skeptical of our ability to keep the Torah—they saw mankind as being too self-obsessed.

We see, then, that a defining characteristic of a Malach is a lack of Bechira, which results in a total negation of any self-interest. Perhaps this is the level of Chachmas Elokim.

When one is called upon to make a decision, render judgement, or to interpret a cryptic message, it is natural that his own preconceptions, self-interests or biases affect his thought process. One may find one party more pitiful, or have his own agendas to advance. In this case he may use his Chachma to reach the verdict that suits him, but he will not have exercised Chachmas Elokim.

Shlomo Hamelech was presented with two women, both of whom may have presented a compelling argument. Indeed, if they were Ruchos it was likely that they could have fooled even the smartest person. In this case, it would be easy for a judge to rely on his instincts, to perhaps try and see which mother presented in a more authentic manner and base a decision on this. Shlomo Hamelech did not resort to this, however, instead he had the ability to put aside any personal observations or leanings and judge based only on the facts. When he saw that one more was more compassionate, he ruled in her favor not because he was swayed emotionally, but because he understood, throught his Chachma, that she was in fact the true mother.

When the Bas Kol affirmed this decision, stating “Hi Imo”, it was a proof that Shlomo had come to this conclusion in the right way—through an ability to see the actual truth and not because of his own feelings or thoughts. The people then understood that he had practiced “Chachmas Elokim”, a Chachma that was on the level of Malachim—totally free of any self-interest. This made them fear the judgement of Shlomo, as Metzudos explains, because there is no escaping from Chachmas Elokim. No amount of posing, flattery or any other falsehood, can sway a judge who is capable of disassociating from his own emotions and self-interest, instead penetrating to the heart of the matter.

Perhaps the story appears in the Navi to teach us a lesson about our own abilities to judge. We know that Chachmas Elokim escapes us, and that we are not on the level of Malachim. When presented with decisions or judgements, on a personal, communal or any level, we must be cognizant of our own self-interests. Because we cannot be expected to negate these emotions in totality, it is important to at least be aware of them so that we can ensure a fair and responsible decision-making process. This awareness will allow us each to make appropriate decisions to the best of our abilities, so that the principals of Mishpat are upheld.