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Beharתשע״ח5778Parsha

Our Best Interest

The essay explores the Halachos of Ribis, emphasizing their connection to Yetzias Mitzrayim and the importance of Bitachon in overcoming natural instincts related to financial dealings.

There are some topics in Halacha that are renowned for their complexity and therefore tend to scare people away. The Halachos of Ribis fall into this category—as anyone who has learned the Gemarahs in Perek Eizehu Neshech can attest, these Dinim are very detailed and can sometimes be difficult to understand relate to. If we learn the Pessukim that speak about this Mitzvah, however, we may discover that besides the actual Halachos and technicalities, the Din of Ribbis holds a message that is vital to our existence as Yidden.

The Torah tells us the Issur of Ribis in two similar Pessukim: “Al Tikach M’Ito Neshech V’Sarbis” and “Es Kaspecha Lo Siten Lo B’Neshech U’Vimarbis Lo Siten Ochlecha”. These Pessukim teach us that Ribis applies not only to money, but to products as well, and highlight the severity with which the Torah views Ribis. In fact, Rashi says that Chazal teach us that the two words “Neshech” and “Sarbis” refer to the same practice—charging interest on a loan—and the Torah includes both “L’Avor Alav B’Shtei Lavin”, so that a person is actually Over two separate Lavin with one action. This too shows us just how offensive the concept of Ribis is in the eyes of Hashem.

We must of course understand why this specific Aveira is seen as one that is so repugnant. Why does the Torah view the practice of Ribis with such severity? Obviously it would be contrary to our Middah of Rachmanus to be usurious and charge interest in a way that oppresses a borrower, but the Issur applies to even the smallest amount of Ribis. In fact, as we know, even a favor or a kind word from a borrower can be viewed as Avak Ribis and should be avoided. It would therefore seem that the Issur is not based on the feelings or comfort of the borrower—there must be a reason that the Torah wished the lender to stay far from anything even remotely related to Ribbis. It is our task to understand why—a question that may be answered based on the next Passuk in the Parsha.

After the two Pessukim regarding Ribbis, before moving on to the next Mitzvah, the Torah adds another Passuk which begins “Ani Hashem Elokeychem Asher Hotzeisi Eschem M’Eretz Mitzrayim”. Based on its placement, this Passuk certainly seems related to the Mitzvah of Ribbis, leading us to ask a relatively basic question: how is Yetzias Mitzrayim connected to Ribbis? Usually Yetzias Mitzrayim is mentioned in relation to Mitzvos to which it is clearly connected, such as the Yomim Tovim, we must therefore understand how Ribbis relates to this most important point in our history.

Rashi himself is sensitive to this question and brings two Pshatim to explain the Smichos of the Pessukim. First, he cites an astounding Gemarah in Bava Mitziah which tells us that Hashem says “Ani Hivchanti Bein Bechor L’Sheaino Bechor Af Ani Yodeah V’Nifra Min Hamalveh Maos L;Yisroel B’Ribis V’Omer Shel Goy Hem.” The Gemrah explains that just as Hashem determined with precision, at the time of Makos Bechoros, which Mitzriyim were Bechorim and which were not, and punished only those who were, He will also determine if someone lends money with interest by claiming the funds belong to a non-Jew.

There are many questions to be asked on this Gemrah. First, there are many Mitzvos in the Torah that one can skirt by making false claims, but we know that at most we can fool our fellow man, why would we need this Passuk to teach us that a person can’t fool Hashem with his factitious claims? Second, we know that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the Tzofeh U’Mabit Kol Hanistaros—even if the Torah wished to teach us that the source of the interest-bearing loans will be known to Him, why did it choose the specific example of Makos Bechoros? What are we to learn from this Gemarah?

The second Pshat brought by Rashi is perhaps a little easier to understand: “Asher Hotzaisicah M’Eretz Mitzrayim Al Menas Shetikablu Aleichem Mitzvosai V’Afilu Hem Kevadim Alechem” According to this Pshat, the Torah is telling us that although the Mitzvah of Ribbis is difficult to keep, our salvation from Mitzrayim was predicated on our Kabalas HaMitzvos, even that some of those Mitzvos are difficult. This would seem to be a broader approach to the Passuk: there is no inherent link between Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim, rather the Torah wishes to be Mechazek our observance of this particularly difficult Mitzvah by mentioning Yetzias Mitzrayim. There are, however, many Mitzvos that are difficult to keep—why then does the Torah use this particular instance to make this statement? There must be a reason that the concept of “Al Minas Ken” is mentioned here, with respect to Ribbis, what might that reason be?

It seems that Rashi is based on a Sifra which has a similar message. There, Chazal tell us: “Asher Hotzaisicah M’Eretz Mitzrayim Al Tinai Shetikablu Mitzvas Ribbis.” According to the Sifra, the condition of Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Al Minas Ken, is specific to the Mitzvah of Ribbis. In fact, the Medrash continues, “Kol HaKofer B’Mitzvas Ribbis K’Ilu Kofer B’Yetzias Mitzrayim.” One who does not accept or believe in the Issur of Ribis is compared to one who rejects the reality of Yetzias Mitzrayim itself. This most impactful Medrash indicates that there is indeed a true connection between Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim, and in its wake we understand that this Passuk is included to teach us about this link, but we must of course understand why this is the case. What is the link between Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim? Why was the Mitzvah of Ribbis a condition of Yetzias Mitzrayim, and why are the two so closely connected that the rejection of Ribbis is akin to a rejection of historical fact?

It certainly seems, whether according to the Gemarah cited by Rashi or the Sifra, that there is a connection between Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim and perhaps Makos Bechoros itself. In order to explain this relationship, it may be useful to have a better understanding of the impact that Yetzias Mitzrayim had on each of us.

In Parshas Emor, the Torah gives us the Mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem: “Vinikdashti B’Soch Bnei Yisroel”. This Mitzvah is one that can be carried out in many ways, and indeed each of us is capable of creating Kiddush Hashem as we go about our regular lives. We know, however, that there are times when members of our Am Kadosh have been called upon to create the ultimate Kiddush Hashem, being Moser Nefesh and giving their very lives L’Kadesh Shem Shamayim. Interestingly, this Mitzvah is too followed by a Passuk regarding Yetzias Mitzaryim, which begins with the words “Hamotzi Eschem M’Eretz Mitzrayim…” The same question that we asked about the Semichus of Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim may of therefore be asked with regard to the Mitzvha of Kiddush Hashem and Yetzias Mitzrayim.

The Sfas Emes, in Parshas Emor, addresses this question with a powerful insight.

As we of course know, Yetzias Mitzrayim was accompanied by Nissim that are well beyond our comprehension. Throughout the Pessukim in Sefer Shemos we learn of a total and complete suspension of Teva, as Hakadosh Baruch Hu brought the Makos which defied every law of nature. These Nissim had an affect that went well beyond Yetzias Mitzrayim, however.

The Sfas Emes explains that by taking us from Mitzrayim, and making us the Am Hanivchar, through a suspension of Teva, Hakadosh Baruch Hu imbued in each of us an ability to act in ways that are Shelo K’Derech Hateva. The idea of being Moser Nefesh, in the most extreme way but really in any way, for the Ribbono Shel Olam is one that is in conflict with our natural: a person naturally places himself—his desires and of course his very life—above all else. To be Moser Nefesh in a way that defies the instincts of self-preservation and self-interest is therefore Shelo K’Derech Hateva, and the Mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem is therefore only possible because of Yetzias Mitzrayim.

It emerges that only because we were taken out of Mitzrayim with Nissim, and a display of control Hashem has on Teva, are we even capable of making a Kiddush Hashem. Therefore, explains the Sfas Emes, the two Pessukim very well belong next to each other, as one is conditioned on the other: only because of Yetzias Mitzrayim, and the way it was carried out, is the Mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem something to which we can aspire.

With this in mind, perhaps we can better understand the relationship between Ribbis and Yetzias Mitzrayim.

The first Passuk that discusses Ribbis, “Al Tikach M’Ito Neshech V’Sarbis”, includes the words “V’Yaresa M’Elokecha” and on those words Rashi explains that an extra does of Yiras Shamayim is necessary for one to keep Ribbis properly because he is Moreh Heter, as his money is “Batul” or dormant, when it is loaned out.

The instinct to charge interest on a loan is a very rational one: when I lend someone else money, I cannot use those funds and he should therefore pay be for that loss. Whereas I could have used that money to invest and produce income, or to buy something, I no longer have that opportunity, and should be justly compensated.

This calculation, however, only makes sense in the world of Teva. If we assume that our money and income are within our control, than we wish to be paid for its use, and the Issur of Ribbis is difficult to avoid. If, however, we understand that we live in a world in which Teva and nature are but a mirage, and there is a Kol Yachol who dictates what we will and won’t have, the Mitzvah becomes easier to keep. True Bitachon, at its most elementary level, removes Teva from all monetary calculations and places them in the hands of the Mefarnes LaKol.

This is perhaps why the Torah views the Mitzvah of Ribbis with such severity, as we noted: because it is so closely tied to our identity as Yidden. Our ability to keep this Mitzvah, which goes against Teva, is rooted in our existence as the Am Hanivchar, and the Torah wishes to highlight just how elemental it is by treating it with great import.

According to this approach we can well understand the Sifra, which tells us that Yetzias Mitzrayim and Ribbis are quite closely connected, and Kol HaKofer B’Mitzvas Ribbis K’Ilu Kofer B’Yetzias Mitzrayim. If one cannot respect the Issur of Ribbis, and believe that he is entitled to be paid for his inability to use those funds, he is lacking in his relationship with Yetzias Mitzrayim. If he understood what that experience did for us, that it placed us in a world that is not dictated by Teva, his relationship with this Mitzah would change as well, as he would be able to look past the fiscal assumptions that are based in Teva.

This also helps explain the more general “Al Mena Ken” of Rashi. The Torah wishes to teach us that even a Mitzvah that is less dramatic than Kiddush Hashem is related to Yetzias Mitzrayim. As we noted, Ribbis is in the catefory of “Afilu Hem Kevadim Alechem” because our view of the world is rooted in Teva. The Tnai of Yetzias Mitzrayim, however, was that we accept even such Mitzvos because it was Yetzias Mitzrayim itself that allowed us to rise above Teva.

We may also be able to understand the Gemrah brought by Rashi with this idea as well.

The Medrash in Shemos Rabbah tells us that the moment of Makos Bechoros marked the completion of the sale of Bechora from Esav to Yaakov, and our selection as the Am Hanivchar. It was at that time that we were truly separated from Esav and the Umos Haolam, and placed upon the pedestal of Beni Bechori Yisroel.

When one acts in a way that is to reliant on Teva, he rejects the distinction between us and them, between Yisroel and the Amim. By charging Ribbis, a practice which is predicated on Teva, he shows that he does not understand the impact of the moment of Makos Bechoros. The Torah relates the exactitude with which Hashem examines our financial dealings to the Makos Bechoros to highlight this reality: if we are better connected to the impact of that moment, we will be less likely to fool ourselves into ignoring this most serious Avreirah.

While these Pessukim obviously contain a vital lesson about Bitachon, and our attitude towards financial gain and loss, there is a more global message as well. We must always be cognizant of the power we have, as members of the Am Hanivchar, to rise above Teva. That which we may think impossible becomes all the more attainable if we remove the constraints of nature. If we lead lives that are connected to the impact of Yetzias Mitzrayim, we will rise to levels we never thought possible, creating a glorious Kiddish Hashem in all our activities.